Collective memory, broadly conceived, has long been held to be an essential component within ethno-national belonging. For example, as Anthony Smith explains, a sense of historical continuity and common heritage is essential to some form of group cohesion and identification (1991). The idea that memory is intrinsic to processes of binding, bonding and 'othering' has been the subject of research across a number of disciplines. Often this work focuses, implicitly or explicitly, on the conflictual and divisive processes that memory mobilization triggers. Abdelal et. al. is important within groups; but those meanings can often be subject to differences of emphasis and interpretation. Given this fluidity, particular aspects of group belonging and identification become salient when they are triggered by changing circumstances (Chandra, 2006) . As John Gillis points out, 'we are constantly revising our memories to suit our current identities'. As such, memory and national identity are congruent and symbiotic: 'Memories help us make sense of the world we live in', he goes on to argue, '"memory work" is, like any other kind of physical or mental labour, embedded in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end (1994, p. 3). Freeden (1996) (in specific relation to ideology) calls decontestation can be glimpsed -in other words, the very meanings that attach to identities (for example, the interpretations given to purportedly critical historical events) are overwritten and overdetermined so as to elide difference and distinction in such a way as to offset or pivot away from conflictual readings. As Graff-McRae points out in her article in this Special Section, often, this glimpse takes place at oblique angles because the act of depoliticization or decontestation depends on silencing or 'ghosting'. The countermemories of non-dominant groups (in Graff-McRae's paper, for instance, gendered experiences of the Northern Irish Troubles) may be forgotten, ignored or pushed aside when they are not easily assimilated into the overarching group-understanding. This special section draws together papers by Rebecca Graff-McRae and Adrian Little and Mark Macmillan that seek to problematize critical and under-studied aspects of these notions; the overarching idea is to explore the roles that memory may play in overcoming division. It is also the case, however, that memory work has the potential, particularly in societies attempting to grapple with long-standing and deep-rooted ethno-national identities, to be used by protagonists to perpetuate or accentuate such conflict, rather than ameliorate it.
Yet, in each instance of the politicization or mobilization of identity an act of depoliticization occurs -other elements, other memories, other experiences are muted, displaced or deferred. In each instance of contestation, an act of what Michael Freeden (1996) (in specific relation to ideology) calls decontestation can be glimpsed -in other words, the very meanings that attach to identities (for example, the interpretations given to purportedly critical historical events) are overwritten and overdetermined so as to elide difference and distinction in such a way as to offset or pivot away from conflictual readings. As Graff-McRae points out in her article in this Special Section, often, this glimpse takes place at oblique angles because the act of depoliticization or decontestation depends on silencing or 'ghosting'. The countermemories of non-dominant groups (in Graff-McRae's paper, for instance, gendered experiences of the Northern Irish Troubles) may be forgotten, ignored or pushed aside when they are not easily assimilated into the overarching group-understanding. This special section draws together papers by Rebecca Graff-McRae and Adrian Little and Mark Macmillan that seek to problematize critical and under-studied aspects of these notions; the overarching idea is to explore the roles that memory may play in overcoming division. It is also the case, however, that memory work has the potential, particularly in societies attempting to grapple with long-standing and deep-rooted ethno-national identities, to be used by protagonists to perpetuate or accentuate such conflict, rather than ameliorate it.
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The rationale echoes that of Ed Cairns and Michael Roe, who argued that 'it is important to study the relationship between memories and conflict in helping to resolve conflicts'. They went on to explain that often 'groups are … left with a sense of "victimhood" that stems from unacknowledged and unreconciled historic losses.
These in turn present a powerful barrier to traditional methods of peacemaking and diplomacy and create new senses of wrong and injustice thus creating the potential for future conflict ' (2003, pp.4-5) . Cairns and Roe point to the fact that within transitions from conflict to peace, memory intersects with democracy in ways that do not always produce stability. The relationship is, of course, ambiguous because no guidelines exist (or are possible) to facilitate a deepening of democracy through memory work.
Frequently, the problem faced in such societies is to balance building stable futures with instituting justice for historic grievances. This dilemma is compounded by the fact that often, in such societies, the language of peace, reconciliation, justice, apology, inclusion, and pluralism is itself filtered through ethnic understandings. The unintended consequence of peace-building policy then may involve issues of growing social fragmentation, increased insecurity, instability and political polarization. As Adrian Little and Mark McMillan argue in their article in this Special Section, it is also the case that researchers need to be aware of contemporary sources of grievance when they focus upon collective memories of ongoing historical conflict.
Memory, Identity and Reconciliation
If memory and memory work then are inherently conflictual, the possibility of using them as foundations for a stable, lasting and peaceful settlement seems misguided.
The point has, perhaps, most famously been elucidated by Max Weber in his 4 discussion of leadership and how Germany would rebuild from the First World War and the internal convulsions that coincided with its conclusion. Weber argued that raking over the causes of the war would be 'politically sterile'; it is part of a false ethic, he argued, of guilt in which social and political responsibility is inverted and focused on the past. The ethic is, essentially, populist and demagogic -it is easy prey for political leaders whose attractiveness lies in their ability to stir emotions rather than reason. For Weber, however, politics depended upon both: 'Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective ' (N.D. [1919] ).
His essay concludes with minor-key reflections on the 'Weltanschauungs politicians' who espouse what he sees as a kind of bad faith in politics -in other words, a criticism of politics without clear alternatives. The obfuscation of responsibility, as he sees it, diverts attention from where the focus ought to be -namely, on building a functional society out of the aftermath of war.
Steve Stern alludes to Weber's discussion at the beginning of his exhaustive dissection of memory politics in Chile. He frames the choice, between focussing on the past or instead on the future, as a 'Faustian bargain'; but he goes on to suggest that mortgaging the past for the sake of the future is perhaps an overly simplistic way of conceptualizing and describing how societies move beyond violence (Stern, 2004, p. xxvii) . Instead, memory construction may be seen not simply as a battle between remembering/remembrance and forgetting; but rather as a very political process involving contestations over meaning, articulation and inscription. Frequently, it involves coming to terms with events that have some kind of inarticulate, traumatic resonance; events which provoke struggles over ownership, authorisation and, 5 ultimately, political (de)legitimacy. There are also critical questions concerning the inter-generational cultural transmission of such memories, which may be mobilized in renewed conflict. This is, perhaps, to be expected: images of the past are key repositories of political authority in the present and are easily harnessed to legitimize contemporary political order(s) (Connerton, 1991, p. 3) . Similarly, moments of transition often create an opening of political opportunities where 'the struggle [over memory] plays out between a variety of actors who claim recognition and legitimacy of their voices and demands. The memories of the oppressed and marginalised and the memories about oppression and repression … emerge, usually with a double intent, that of asserting the "true" version of history based on their memories, and that of demanding justice' (Jelin, 2003, p. 29) .
This paper explores some of the ways in which the in-group or intra-bloc competition over memory and remembrance, which constitutes so much of the dynamics of ethnonaionalist politics, reveals the limitations of Weber's problematic. In other words, while memory-work does occur at the national level it also constitutes much of what goes on at a lower, group-based level. (Although this is hinted at within Weber's paper -hence his despair over the emergence of a political culture dedicated to cynicism and emotionalism -his primary emphasis is to do with the frameworks of administration and political leadership that can emerge from transitions.) Memory 'wars' occur between ostensibly antagonistic ethnic communities over the distribution of state resources and the achieving of national and international recognition (Kubal, 2010; McGrattan 2012 (Murray and Tonge, 2005) . On the other hand, the moderate, middle-class, small-c conservative and establishmentProtestant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) has been electorally overtaken by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) -a more radical, evangelical-based, ultraconservative alternative. Yet, as Henry Patterson points out, this has not happened simply because of intra-bloc outbidding; in fact, SF and the DUP can be seen to have moderated their stances in tandem with the strategic decision by the British and Irish states to remove overt political sponsorship of ethno-national blocs during the peace process, in effect delegitimising sectarian ideologies (2007, pp. 343-44) . As such, while both the nationalist and unionist electorates have increasingly opted to vote for ethnic tribune parties, a degree of underbidding is also occurring within each bloc. At this intra-bloc level, a retrenchment of conservative and even moderate politics occurs as the two main unionist and nationalist parties -the DUP and SF respectively -seek to colonize the political space that was once the preserve of more 'moderate' parties such as the SDLP on the Catholic-nationalist 'side' and the UUP, which has been mainly supported by Protestant-unionist voters.
Although it is perhaps not as immediately apparent, a degree of underbidding is also discernible (and logically necessary) at the inter-bloc level. For example, this has been observed in the DUP's purported targeting of conservative, traditional Catholic voters through their hard-line stances against abortion and gay marriage (Tonge et al, 2015) , and through SF's attempts at unionist 'outreach' by speaking of a willingness to hold 'uncomfortable conversations' about the past (Hopkins, 2015; McGrattan, 2016) . While there may not be many immediate returns in terms of electoral capital in such activity -even under PR-STV vote transfers across the ethno-religious divide are minimal -a certain amount of political cache may reside in offsetting fears and suspicions among out-bloc voters. In effect, a delicate balancing act may be discerned: on the one hand, the maintenance of a relatively stable political culture is fostered through commemorative and symbolically salient work that focuses on inbloc sentiments and ideological tropes; on the other hand, more accommodative, open or even liberal positions are advocated to appeal to moderate supporters and to give the appearance of recognition of the beliefs of the 'other' ethno-nationalist bloc. This balancing act is logical in an era where the demographic gap between the Catholic minority and Protestant majority is increasingly marginal.
1 In other words, despite apparent mutual antipathy, it is in the interests of politicians from both ethno-religious blocs to 'keep the ball in play' and maintain a semblance of political functionality.
And it is this imperative -namely, a dynamic driven by aims that are almost taboo 8 because to articulate them publicly would be to endanger the goodwill or wilful blindness upon which their political capital rests -that shapes intra-bloc competition.
Our claim is, thus twofold: not only does intra-bloc competition remain an underappreciated facet of the dynamics of transition in ethnically divided societies; but, secondly, that it can give rise to the appearance of democratic vitality and debate. Our argument is that it establishes the parameters for that debate, in effect, giving meaning to otherwise contestable and decontested concepts. Thus, the very framing of potentially contentious events, issues or problems is implicitly linked to a kind of 'policing' mentality that denotes the limitations of what is sayable or thinkable and the boundaries beyond which the unsayable lies.
Intra-Bloc Memory Competition
Viewing in-group or intra-bloc dissensus as framed by or set within the parameters of between-group relations, then, means paying close attention to the changing salience and meanings of concepts that are core to the group's ideological and normative coherence. When ethno-nationalist groups are making a transition from violent conflict to a more peaceful and democratic environment, reconciliation may be one such concept, implying as it does a settlement and a settled view of self but also a
journey and something open-ended (Schaap, 2005) . The concept is operationalized by being understood as a kind of direct object -in other words, reconciliation is an endpoint or an outcome of a political process. Alternatively, it can be understood as a verb -something that is done, a set of actions with an uncertain outcome (McGrattan, 9 2015) . Reconciliation also has a policing function: for reconciliation to occur, particular memories or ideas about the past are rendered taboo -a kind of unacknowledged 'pact of forgetting' in which the more sectarian and violent tropes are left aside or 'forgotten' for the sake of contemporary group or societal cohesion (Rieff, 2011) . The languages and vocabulary of 'peace' and 'reconciliation' may, in this way, mask continuing antagonism. As Stef Jansen has pointed out in work on Serbian and Croatian remembrance and memory cultivation, claims-making based on the past does not necessarily need to involve the construction of new memories or the revision or airbrushing of historical 'facts'; rather, it proceeds in an ambiguous, negotiated and nuanced fashion based on vagueness regarding context and chronology and selectivity in recall and forgetting. Importantly, he argues, those dynamics are not simply the product of elite mobilization but may be an effort at an everyday level to abrogate responsibility: 'Not being too precise was considered wise: since vagueness allowed for generalised accusations, it protected the speaker from potentially nasty probing questions about individual responsibility and knowledge and it prevented speaking up about issues bringing one into a socially sensitive position. Vagueness, therefore, was a crucial instrument of self-protection ' (2002, pp. 84-85) .
Paradoxically, Jelin has identified these dynamics within the construction of ethnicized memory as being predicated on a sentiment or a belief in timeliness. That is, the content of memories being constructed is contained and shaped by a clearly set and unchanging conception of past, present, and future. In such a view, there is no room for diversity in the conception of time itself. Notions of time thus appear to stay outside the social frameworks and the actual processes of "framing" memories ' (2003, p.13) . Duncan Bell makes a similar point when he argues that the effect of nationalist memory-making is to act as a 'story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation's past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through For Augé, this duty of memory works to balance the Weberian duty to forget and move forward. Individual and counter-memory and what might be termed the historical record (primary, archival sources, autobiographies and oral history archives), however, provide impediments to the manipulation of the past. As Michael
Schudson has argued, the past is not completely malleable: 'Yes, individuals and groups try to co-opt memory for their own purposes; but no, they do not do so with a free hand so long as success in even convincing oneself requires non-contradiction by others ' (1989, p. 112) . In other words, silencing, forgetting and deferral are limited by counter-memory and, as Jacques Derrida points out the 'deafening consensus' that they create in insisting on particularistic memories or narratives about the past simply 'arouses a suspicion . . . [and] awakens us where it would like to put us to sleep' (1994, p.97) .
Memory and the Past in Northern Ireland
As pointed out above, the imperative for cultivating intra-bloc cohesion around specific narratives about the past and the fencing-off of alternative readings as almost taboo is shaped and constrained by broad and perhaps under-acknowledged inter-bloc dynamics. To be sure, in Northern Ireland this balance is precarious and negotiated 
Conclusion
Contributors within this special section explore ways in which these processes occur and assess the ethical implications they entail. Through an emphasis on silence -and, in particular, how legal processes and discursive dynamics can work to mute and marginalize speech and speakers -both papers work not only to reveal the limitations that may proceed from laudable aims such as transparency, fairness and proportionality; but, in so doing, they help to invert the power disparities and marginalizing practices that can arise from those aims.
The key aim of this special section, however, is not simply to account for democratic set-backs; rather we hope to explore the possibilities that memory might play an integrative role in such societies, dampening bloc perceptions of injustice and victimhood, allaying sectarian attitudes, and promoting an inclusive political culture. are on the right tracks. A complementary point can be found in the work of de Brito et al (2001: p. 17) , who point out that it is in precisely those countries with the weakest democratic traditions where we find the greatest need for strong democratizing processes. They go on to argue that '[r]ather than talk about reconciliation, it is more appropriate to ask whether accountability processes can contribute to affirming democratic governance ' (p.27) .
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We suggest, therefore, that post-conflict, deeply-divided societies present 'difficult cases' for the integrative potential of memory, but that that potential may be located within research questions such as -To what extent is memory necessarily adversarial and contentious?
-Are non-conflictual forms of memory possible? What might they look like?
-Can memory be reconciled with notions of forgiveness, shared responsibility for the past, and reconciliation itself?
-What are the empirical impediments to integrative memory?
-To what extent can we evaluate policy success or failure in this area?
Contributors to this special section tackle these issues and questions by filtering them through the lens of societies marked by deep cleavages.
